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I.

COPYRIGHT AND TRADE SECRET CLAIMS

Introduction

Congress intended that the 1976 Copyright Act' and state trade
secret law would coexist,2 and that the Copyright Act would preempt
a state claim only where its prima facie case is equivalent, element by
element, to a copyright claim.3 Allowing for this concurrence raises
new difficulties, however.
In particular, does allowing the two systems of intellectual
property law to coexist authorize both to be invoked
simultaneously? For example, assuming that both causes of action
can be established, can a plaintiff recover an injunction under
section 502 of the Copyright Acte while, at the same time, recover
punitive damages under trade secret law?5 Similarly, can an author
trade secret restrictions were placed
assert a copyright claim where
6
agreement?
licensing
in a
1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-702 (1994)).
2. See H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) ("The evolving
common law right[ ] of... trade secrets... would remain unaffected [by the 1976
Copyright Act] as long as the cause[ ] of action contains elements.., that are
different in kind from copyright infringement."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994);
MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.40(A) (3d ed. 1998)
3. See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that the "breach of a duty of trust or confidentiality compris[ing] the
core of actions for trade secret misappropriation ...supplies the extra element that
qualitatively distinguishes such trade secret causes of action from claims for copyright
infringement that are based solely upon copying.") (internal quotation marks and
citations deleted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994). A major advantage of seeking an injunction under
the Copyright Act is that nationwide service of process is available to start the action.
See id. § 502(b). It is doubtful whether such power would be available on a trade
secret injunction as the court may not have the necessary contacts with the individual
under the InternationalShoe doctrine.
5. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has been adopted in forty-one states
and the District of Columbia, see Commentary to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (1997), authorizes the
imposition of punitive damages. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 455
(1985). See, e.g., Robert L. Cloud & Assoc., Inc. v. Mikesell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 14849 (Ct. App. 1999). Such damages are unavailable under the Copyright Act. See
Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Th[e] damages structure [of
the Copyright Act] is not designed... to be punitive. ... [A]s the Supreme Court has
stated quite clearly, '[t]he purpose is thus to provide just compensation for the wrong,
not to impose a penalty by giving to the copyright proprietor profits which are not
attributable to the infringement.' ") (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940)).
6. It is important to distinguish at the outset that this article is examining the
viability of a copyright claim being made where trade secret status has also been
asserted, not the viability of maintaining a trade secret claim for a work that is also
copyrighted. In this latter case, it should now be beyond debate that properly formed
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This potential collision between the federal copyright law and
state trade secret laws resulted from the replacement of the Copyright
Act of 1909.' When Congress adopted the Copyright Act of 1976,8 a
fundamental change occurred in the way the copyright law
functioned. Under the Copyright Act of 1909 and its predecessors,
federal copyright law became applicable to a work upon its
publication with notice of a copyright claim.9 As a consequence,
when an author claimed federal copyright protection, the contents of
the author's work were disclosed by their publication. Under the
1976 Act, however, copyright applies as soon as the work is "fixed in
any tangible medium of expression... from which [it] can be
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated .... 0 Unlike the
earlier law, no publication need occur to claim a federal copyright.
A consequence of this change in methodology can be seen in any
writing that contains a trade secret. Under the pre-1976 copyright
system, trade secret status was lost, by definition, upon publication."
trade secret claims are not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976, see e.g., Data
General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994);
Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574 (4th Cir. 1994), or by the Copyright
Act of 1909, see e.g., M. Bryce & Assocs., Inc. v. Gladstone, 319 N.W.2d 907, 914-16
(Wis. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at §
4.04[A].
7. 61 Stat. 652 (codifying the 1909 Act as amended) amended by Act of Apr. 27,
1948, ch. 236, 62 Stat. 202, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646 § 39, 62 Stat. 992, Act of June
3, 1949, ch. 171, 63 Stat. 153, Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655 § 16, 65 Stat. 716, Act of July
17, 1952, ch. 923, 66 Stat. 752, Act of Apr. 13, 1954, ch. 137 § 2, 68 Stat. 52, Act of Aug.
31, 1954, ch. 1161, 68 Stat. 1030, Act of Mar. 29, 1956, ch. 109, 70 Stat. 63, Act of Sept.
7, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-313, 71 Stat. 633, Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-646 § 21,
76 Stat. 446, Act of Oct. 27, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-297, 79 Stat. 1072, Act of Aug. 12,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375 § 6(i), 84 Stat. 777, Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140,
85 Stat. 391, Act of June 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-310, Title II § 205, 86 Stat. 203, Act of
Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93573, Title I §§ 102 & 104, 88 Stat. 1873 [hereinafter
Copyright Act of 1909], repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1332).
8. See supra note 1.
9. See Copyright Act of 1909, § 10; see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.
339,346-47 (1908).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). See H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53
(1976).
11. Section 1(4)(ii) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act establishes that "efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain [the trade secret's] secrecy"
are needed. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act §1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985). Clearly,
publication as defined in the Copyright Act, "the distribution of copies ... of a work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending,"
demonstrates a lack of reasonable effort. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
A slightly more difficult question of disclosure is faced if the work is licensed
under a contract that requires secrecy. In this case, however, the sound argument
is that the work has not, in fact, been published. Indeed, under the 1909 Act, the
concept of "limited publication," which would not trigger the applicability of
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It was not possible, therefore, to claim both a copyright and a trade

secret under the 1909 act. There is nothing that prevents a trade
secret from being fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Under
the 1976 act, therefore, an author can apparently claim his or her
copyright while refusing to disclose the contents of the work to the

public. Nevertheless, the concept of disclosing the copyrighted work
to the public is inherent in the Constitutional basis of copyright.
As the Constitution authorizes Congress to grant copyrights, it
subjects the power to a public purpose requirement.12 Any monopoly
Congress grants must be for the purpose of "promot[ing] the progress
of science and useful arts." 3 But one result of Congress enacting the

1976 Act is a potential conflict between the Act and this public
purpose requirement. An owner of intellectual property may believe
that both copyright law-which mandates disclosure-and trade
secret law-which mandates secrecy-can be used simultaneously.
To believe that disclosure and secrecy can coexist is doublethink as

both cannot be true.

federal law, was created for this type of situation. See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d
744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952).
The most difficult situation faced concerns, not surprisingly, computer
programs. If a computer program is distributed only in object code form, does the
general distribution of the object code disclose any trade secrets contained in the
code? One court has indicated that the distribution of object code does not
disclose the contained trade secrets as they "may have been concealed within
impenetrable programming codes, making reverse engineering difficult or
impossible." Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Of course, the court's factual assumption that object code is
"impenetrable" is flawed as disassembling or decompiling a computer program is
not particularly technically challenging although the quality of the disassembled or
decompiled program will vary depending on the compiler or assembler used. See
JONATHAN B. ROSENBERG, HOW DEBUGGERS WORK: ALGORITHMS, DATA
STRUCTURES, AND ARCHITECTURE 12, 145-47, 157-72, 205-13 (1996); ANTHONY L.
CLAPES, SOFIWARS 146 (1993); see also http://www.sourceretrieval.com/ myso.html

(visited July 17, 1999) (decompiler products); http://www.ahpah.com/product.html
(visited July 17, 1999) (same); http://www.software.ibm.com/ad/hlasm/ library/
html/tug-dasm.html (visited July 17, 1999) (disassembler). Of course, if code
optimization is performed, decompiling or disassembling becomes significantly
harder. See ROSENBERG, supra at 205-07, 211-13. See generally, John Hennessey,
Symbolic Debugging of Optimized Code, in 4 A.C.M. TRANSACTIONS ON
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND SYSTEMS 323 (1982).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
The public purpose
requirement of the Clause is the requisite that whatever monopoly Congress chooses
to establish under the Constitution must promote progress. See Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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This unconstitutional doublethink can be prevented judicially.
The developing misuse of copyright defense 4 provides the court with
the mechanism needed to avoid the problem. Consequently, this
article begins by describing the copyright misuse defense. It then
presents the constitutional framework of federal intellectual property
law. Then, the fact that a simultaneous claim of copyright and trade
secret protection constitutes a form of constitutional doublethink will
be developed, thus leading to the conclusion that the misuse defense
should be-indeed, constitutionally must be-expanded to prevent
intellectual property owners from engaging in unconstitutional
doublethink.
II.

The Copyright Misuse Defense

Considerable confusion has existed concerning the scope of the
copyright misuse defense.15 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
announced a quite broad interpretation of the defense in Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 an interpretation not well received by
some commentators. However, as the United States Supreme Court
has reinforced subsequent to the Lasercomb case, "[t]he primary
objective of copyright is not to reward.., authors, but '[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' ,,18 Further, Lasercomb's
14. The Fourth Circuit discussed the misuse of copyright defense by stating the
following:
The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright] carries
out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to [Authors]... the exclusive Right... to their
["original" works]. But the public policy which includes [original works]
within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in
the [original expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright] to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the
[Copyright] Office and which is contrary to public policy to grant.
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
15. See e.g., William E. Thomson, Jr. & Margaret Y. Chu, Overstepping the
Bounds: Copyright Misuse, 11 COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 6 (1998); Sean M. Aylward,
Note, Copyright Law: The Fourth Circuit's Extension of the Misuse Doctrine to the
Area of Copyright: A Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine?-LasercombAmerica, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 661 (1992); Scott A.
Miskimon, Note, Divorcing Public Policyfrom Economic Reality: the Fourth Circuit's
CopyrightMisuse Doctrine in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1672 (1991); DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 4.04A (1998).
16. 911 F.2d 970, 978 (1990).
17. See e.g., Leslie Wharton, Misuse and Copyright: A Legal Mismatch,
COMPUTER LAW., March, 1991, at 1; Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The
Search for Functional CopyrightMisuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401,401 (1994).
18. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349
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interpretation of the misuse defense can be used to implement these
public rights under the Clause. Consequently, this article examines

the development of the misuse of copyright defense to an infringement action. 9 The analysis includes a survey of the historic origins of
the misuse defense in the patent laws and an examination of the
current interpretations of the copyright misuse defense.
A.

The Development of the Copyright Misuse Defense

The copyright misuse defense has not been acknowledged for
long; 20 indeed, some debate still continues concerning the defense's
viability. 21 The strongest support for the existence of the defense, and

the most complete exposition of it, comes from the Fourth Circuit's

decision in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,22 but the Supreme
Court2 3 and a majority of the other circuits have also acknowledged
the defense's existence.24
In Lasercomb, the plaintiff brought a copyright infringement
action alleging that Reynolds and other defendants had copied its
Interact computer program' for the defendants' own use and as a
(1991) (citation omitted).
19. The principal case cited for the existence of a misuse of copyright defense is
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). Other courts have
acknowledged the existence of the defense, but have tended not to find the defense to
have been established factually. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,
975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying Ninth Circuit case law); Hill v. Xyquad,
Inc., 939 F.2d 627, 631-32 (8th Cir. 1991); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). This
trend of finding that the defense exists but choosing not to use it is changing. See
Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 339 (1997) (finding that the AMA misused its copyright
as a matter of law); see also DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,
81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction as
"DGI may well prevail on its affirmative defense of copyright misuse."). See generally
Thomas F. Smegal, Jr., Misuse Defense Gains in Federal Courts, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15,
1993, at 18.
20. Cf 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.09[A] at 13-288 (1997) (The 1962 United States Supreme Court case, U.S. v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, "tacit[ly] approv[ed] ... an antitrust misuse defense ... ")
For an earlier lower court opinion that applied the misuse defense to deny
enforcement of a copyright, see M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 848-50
(D. Minn. 1948); see also Roger Arar, Note, Redefining CopyrightMisuse, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 1291 (1981).
21. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 20, at § 13.09[A].
22. 911 F.2d 970 (1990).
23. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
8 n.13 (1979) ("We are unable to see how that alone could make out [a]... misuse of
copyrights.").
24. See sources cited infra note 33.
25. This program is a computer-aided design and manufacturing program
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basis for their own substantially identical computer program, PDS1000.26 The district court found that copying had occurred and
enjoined the distribution of PDS-1000. 27
The defendants in Lasercomb asserted misuse of copyright as an
affirmative defense to Lasercomb's action.

The factual foundation

of the defense was a provision in Lasercomb's standard licensing
agreement that prohibited the defendants for ninety-nine years from
"writ[ing], develop[ing], produc[ing] . .. or sell[ing] computer assisted
die making software."29
Lasercomb's holding that a copyright misuse defense does exist is

clear. "We are persuaded... that a misuse of copyright defense is
inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is
inherent in patent law." 3 The court justified this holding by drawing
the parallel between the patent law's and the copyright law's primary

purpose of "increas[ing] the store of human knowledge and arts by
rewarding.., exclusive rights.., for a limited time,"3 with their
parallel

limitation

against

extending

"the

granted

monopoly

power.., to property not covered by the patent or copyright."32
Many other circuits have also examined whether there is a
misuse defense in copyright actions.3 The First Circuit recognized
favorably the misuse defense in dictum that relied on Lasercomb, but
did not apply the defense, nor did it hold that such a defense existed
as the defendant could not establish the antitrust violation it alleged.'

In the Fifth Circuit, the court refused its first opportunity to apply the
defense as "the copyright holders' actions [were] not inconsistent with

(CAD/CAM) designed for use in the manufacture of the steel dies used to cut and
form cardboard boxes. See Lasercomb America, 911 F.2d at 971.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 972.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 972-73.
30. Lasercomb America, 911 F.2d at 973.
31. Id. at 976.
32. Id.
33. See e.g. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q 409 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Hill v. Xyquad, Inc., 939 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1991); Practice Management
Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 339 (1997); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991), reh'g granted, 977 F.2d
1435 (11th Cir. 1992), decided on different grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994).
34. See Data General Corp., 36 F.3d at 1169-70.
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any policy of the copyright laws."35 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit
did apply the defense in several later cases. 36 The Seventh Circuit
enforced a copyright after determining that no attempt had been

made to extend the copyright beyond the statutory rights given to the
copyright holder and that no anti-trust violation had occurred. 37 The
Eighth Circuit, without discussing the substance of a misuse defense,
remanded a similiar case acknowledging that a misuse defense might
be established on remand.38

In the Ninth Circuit, the court

confusingly held that "[t]he defense of unclean hands by virtue of
copyright misuse prevents the copyright owner from asserting
infringement and asking for damages when the infringement occurred

by his dereliction of duty."39 Finally, in a opinion ultimately decided
on different grounds after a rehearing en banc, ° the Eleventh Circuit

refused to' apply the defense "because there [was] no antitrust
violation.
Thus, over half of the circuits have acknowledged the existence

of some form of a copyright misuse defense or have applied it to a
case before them. Additionally, many district courts without circuit
court precedent to follow have also allowed the defense. 2 But as the

35. Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at 865.
36. In the first case, DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81
F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996), the court expressly adopted the Fourth Circuit's
formulation of the misuse defense in Lasercomb to uphold the granting of a
preliminary injunction. Subsequently, in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,
166 F.3d 772, 793 n.85 (5th Cir. 1999), noting that cases involving preliminary
injunctions are not binding, the court reaffirmed the holding of DSC Communications
ina case awarding final relief.
37. See generally F.E.L. Publications,Ltd., 214 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 409.
38. See Hill, 939 F.2d at, 631-32.
39. Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Board of Realtors, 786
F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507
(4th Cir. 1969).
40. See Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information
Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994).
41. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information
Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir 1991).
42. See e.g. Reliability Research, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,
793 F. Supp. 68, 69-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1336-37
(N.D. Ohio 1992); National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772
F. Supp. 614, 652 (D.D.C. 1991); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Broadcast Music v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Services,
746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 487,488 (D. Del. 1978); cf Allen-Myland, Inc. v. I.B.M. Corp., 746 F.
Supp. 520, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that violation of antitrust consent decree
could estop enforcement of a copyright). Contra Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist
Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987), affd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.
1990), affd on other grounds,499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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brief discussion above indicates, it is quite unclear what must be
shown to establish the copyright misuse defense.
The courts' expositions of the defense have tended to
conglomerate several independent aspects of it instead of
distinguishing each concept as a separate theory of misuse. In
Lasercomb, for example, part of the court's. discussion uses the
language of antitrust, apparently focusing on the anticompetitive
nature of the copyright owner's behavior to determine that copyright
enforcement is barred. 3 At other times, however, the court addresses
the violation by the copyright owner of the general public policy of
copyright without elucidating from where this public policy derives."
The defense in the hands of other circuits, particularly the Ninth,
has fared even less well. 5 In Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando
Board of Realtors, the Ninth Circuit held:
The defense of unclean hands by virtue of copyright misuse
prevents the copyright owner from asserting infringement and
asking for damages when the infringement occurred by his
dereliction of duty. Plaintiff's action will be dismissed under the
theory of unclean hands if defendant establishes that plaintiff's
evidence was false and that plaintiff was involved in a scheme to
defraud the public."
The court in Supermarket of Homes seemed to confuse the
misuse of copyright defense with the general defense of unclean
hands.4 '7 The court also failed to provide any elucidation for what
kind of "dereliction of duty" would be needed to support the defense;
indeed, it is difficult to understand under what kind of "duty" the
copyright owner was placed by the decision as is shown by lower
courts' attempts to interpret Supermarketof Homes.48
43. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978, 979 (4th Cir.
1990) (describing the licensing agreement at bar as "anticompetitive").
44. See id. at 978 (finding that violating the "public policy embodied in the grant
of a copyright" is misuse).
45. See sources cited supranote 39 and accompanying text.
46. 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)
47. Compare 3 NIMMER, supra note 20, at § 13.09[A] 3 NIMMER, supra note 20, at

§ 13.09[B].
48. Cf Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal.),
rev'd on othergrounds,977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). The court stated the following:
The defense of copyright misuse is a form of unclean hands, which
prevents the copyright owner from obtaining relief "when the
infringement occurred by his dereliction of duty."
Supermarket of
Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Board of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400,
1408 (9th Cir. 1986). Accolade's copyright misuse defense is based upon
antitrust tying allegations, which the court ordered stricken from
Accolade's counterclaim. No antitrust violation is alleged, nor is there
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Subsequent cases in the Ninth Circuit have not addressed the
confusion created by Supermarket of Homes-no comprehensible
definition of "duty" or "dereliction of duty" has ever been provided.
More recently, however, the circuit seems to be effectively ignoring
Supermarket of Homes in its entirety 49 or, while acknowledging the
case, is moving the misuse defense in line with the Fourth Circuit's
exposition.50
To clarify the defense, the courts should recognize that misuse of
copyright has two branches. 1 First, misuse is found where the
proof of fraud or other clear violation of a legal duty ...
Thus,
Accolade has failed to establish a copyright misuse defense.
Id. at 1399; see also Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, No. C-92-4049 (DLJ),
1994 WL 508826 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 85 F.3d
1424 (9th Cir. 1996). The court found that
Defense of unclean hands is similarly inapplicable to the facts at hand.
Such defense operates to deprive a copyright owner from asserting
infringement and asking for damages when the infringement occurred by
the claimant's dereliction of duty. See Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San
Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).
Here, any shortcomings by Magnuson in protecting his copyright interests
do not rise to the level necessary to invoke the defense of unclean hands.
Nor has it been proved that Magnuson prosecuted this action with
anything less than due diligence and good faith ....
Id. at *5.
49. See Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th
Cir. 1995) (citing Lasercomb, the court found no misuse). Supermarket of Homes is
not cited.
50. See Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass'n, 121
F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 339 (1997) (citing to Lasercomb and
Supermarket of Homes, the court held that expanding the monopoly granted by
copyright is misuse, but made no attempt to find a "duty" or a "dereliction of duty.").
51. Lasercomb implied that this distinction is valid:
The district court['s] reliance on [antitrust law] was misplaced.... Such
reliance is, however, understandable.
Both the presentation by
appellants and the literature tend to intermingle antitrust and misuse
defenses.
A patent or copyright is often regarded as a limited
monopoly-an exception to the general public policy against restraints of
trade. Since antitrust law is the statutory embodiment of that public
policy, there is an understandable association of antitrust law with the
misuse defense. Certainly, an entity which uses its patent as the means of
violating antitrust law is subject to a misuse of patent defense. However,
Morton Salt held that it is not necessary to prove an antitrust violation in
order to successfully assert patent misuse ....
[Sbo while it is true that
the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law probably would
give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily
true-a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to
comprise an equitable defense to an infringement action. The question is
not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust
law (such as whether the licensing agreement is "reasonable"), but
whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.
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copyright owner uses his or her copyright to precipitate an antitrust
violation, most often by tying the copyrighted work to an
uncopyrighted product52 or requiring a blanket license to be
purchased."
Second, misuse is found where the copyright owner
violates the underlying copyright policy principles. Unfortunately for
the second branch of the defense, the courts have been significantly
less clear about the defense's requisites. In particular, the courts have
failed to articulate what the copyright policy principles are and from
where they are derived. In Lasercomb, for example, the decision
makes reference to the "public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright"54 or the "public policy embodied in copyright law"55 but
does not indicate clearly what the source of this "public policy"
should be. Yet, when examining the decisions that have applied
Lasercomb's misuse defense, and when the underlying policy
considerations of Lasercomb itself are examined, all of the cases are
consistent with defining the "public policy" based on the public
purpose requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause.
To understand the defense and resolve the intercircuit confusion,
the patent misuse defense will be examined. This is appropriate as
the copyright misuse defense owes its origin to the same defense in
the patent law56 and it can more easily be understood in its historical
context. Based on the structure of the patent misuse defense, the
cases applying the copyright misuse defense will be examined. As will
become apparent, most of the cases that have defined the copyright
misuse defense have done so in a manner that is consistent with the
patent misuse defense even where the courts did not specifically make
reference to the patent law. Once this is done, the public policy
branch of the copyright misuse defense will be examined as, because
of fundamental differences between patent and copyright law, the
copyright misuse defense requires greater strength on this branch
than the patent misuse defense does.
B.

The Analogous Misuse of Patent Defense

Generally, the misuse of patent defense is established whenever
a patent holder uses the patent to violate the antitrust laws or extends
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1990).
52. See e.g., Service & Training Inc. v. Data General Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 690 (4th
Cir. 1992).
53. See e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment
Services, 746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
54. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 976-77.
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the scope of the patent monopoly beyond that given by statute.57
Originally, the defense was judicially created 8 although today it has
been recognized59 and partially modified 6° by statute. The statute does
not attempt to define what misuse is; rather, it has specified a few
things that it is not." To understand the defense, therefore, it is
necessary to examine the cases that created it.
Before the 1930s, the courts did not recognize the misuse of
patent defense. As one court stated,
The present complainants are entitled by the patent laws to a
monopoly, for the term of the patent, of the manufacture and
sale of the [invention] made under it. The right to this
monopoly is the very foundation of the patent system. They do
not lose that right merely because they may have joined in a
combination with others, holding other patents securing similar
monopolies, which combination may, when judicially examined
in a proper forum, be held to be unlawful.
For the early courts, a violation of the antitrust laws, even one
accomplished because of an improper use of the patent monopoly,
did not imply that the patent should be disregarded.63 The fact that a
patent holder held a property interest in that patent was more
important than how that property was used." One court analogized
an antitrust violation by a patent holder to the operation of a brothel
by a fee holder.65 Just as the fee holder would not lose the real estate
57. See 6 DONALD S.CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04[2] (1998).
58. See id. § 19.04[1][b].
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
60. See Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat.
4674, 4676 (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)).

61.

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).

62. Edison Electric Light Co. v. Sawyer-Man Electric Co., 53 F. 592, 598 (2d Cir.
1892), cert. denied, 149 U.S. 785 (1893).
63. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 57, at § 19.04[1][a]; see also Edison Electric Light, 53
F.2d 598.
64. See Brown Saddle Co.v. Troxel, 98 F. 620, 621 (N.D. Ohio 1899) The court
found that
The averment that the complainant is part of a combination or trust is
irrelevant and impertinent, for the reason that it is no ground for denying
relief for continued trespasses by a third person upon the property of the
complainant. The fact that a corporation is part of an illegal combination
or trust cannot justify the spoliation of the property which belongs to it by
third persons. It is merely seeking by its bill to preserve its rights in its
own property. What it may do with that property, or is doing with that
property, cannot deprive it of its right to invoke the protection of the
court against trespass and infringement."
Id.
65. See Strait v. National Harrow, 51 F. 819, 820-21 (N.D.N.Y. 1892).
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because of the illegal activity, the patent holder would not lose patent
rights.66
Starting with Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development
Corp.,67 the Supreme Court established the misuse defense. In
Carbice Corp., the court held,
But [a patentee] may not exact as the condition of a license that
unpatented materials used in connection with the invention shall
be purchased only from the licensor; and if it does so, relief
against one who supplies such unpatented materials will be
denied. The limited monopoly to make, use, and vend an article
may not be expanded by limitations
as to materials and supplies
6
necessary to the operation of it.

8

Despite Carbice Corp., the lower courts remained hostile to the
misuse defense.6 9
In 1942, the Supreme Court decided Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co. 71 Morton Salt definitively established the defense:

Where the patent is used as a means of restraining competition
with the patentee's sale of an unpatented product, the successful
prosecution of an infringement suit even against one who is not
a competitor in such sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance of
the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article, and is thus a
contributing factor in thwarting the public policy underlying the
grant of the patent. Maintenance and enlargement of the
attempted monopoly of the unpatented article are dependent to
some extent upon persuading the public of the validity of the
patent, which the infringement suit is intended to establish.
Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the
patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and
should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper
practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the
misuse of the patent have been dissipated. 7'
Morton Salt involved a direct tying arrangement where the
patent holder required licensees to purchase unpatented salt tablets
from the patent holder as a condition for a license to use the patented
66. See id. But cf Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (finding that a wife's
half interest in automobile could be seized by the state for her husband's criminal
conduct despite wife's lack of participation or knowledge of the criminal activity).
67. See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(1931), reh'g granted, 283 U.S. 420 (1931).
68. Id. at 31 (footnote, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
69. See 6 CHISUM, supranote 57, at § 19.04[1l][a].
70. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
71. Id.at 493.
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device. 72 The court did not determine if this practice violated the
Clayton Act 73 but did indicate that the practice would make the
patent unenforceable.74 In subsequent holdings, the court made it
clear that it was not a violation of the antitrust laws that was needed;
rather, misuse would be found whenever the licensing of a patented
71
article was dependent on the use of another unpatented item, or
when the licensee was being required to pay patent royalties despite
not exercising the patent. 6
Since the Morton Salt decision, the courts have more completely
defined the misuse defense, developing three principal types of
conduct

77

that will prevent enforcement of the patent:

A tying arrangement between protected and unprotected
Salt.8
products such as the one involved in Morton
2. A limitation against the licensee developing competing
products with that covered by the patent.79
3. Coercively requiring blanket licenses of more patents than
desired by the licensee without an overriding justification' if
the patent holder has market power."
1.

72. See id. at 490.
73. See id. Under modem antitrust analysis, the tying of products does not
necessarily constitute a violation of the law unless the company involved is a major
participant in the particular market, the tying arrangement will likely have an adverse
competitive effect and the tying is not independently justified. See e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 26-27 (1995).
74. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
75. See Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637,
640 (1947).
76. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969).
77. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 57, at § 19.04[3].
78. See generally id. § 19.04[3][a]. As Professor Chisum discusses, Congress has
modified the holding in Morton Salt by requiring that the patent holder have market
power in addition to tying in the unpatented product. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(5) (1994).
79. See National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d
Cir. 1943); Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 44 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972).
80. See American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d
Cir. 1959). An important exception where a blanket patent will not be deemed
misuse is where two patents overlap each other so that a device sold under one of the
patents would necessarily infringe the other. In this case, no misuse will be found. See
International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965).
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
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Other types of misconduct outside of these three areas either
have not universally been deemed misuse or constitute such a

remarkably narrow malfeasance that their applicability is minimal.
The courts are split, for example, about whether attempting to collect
patent royalties after the expiration of the patent constitutes misuse,'

whether (or when) discrimination in royalty requirements among
licensees is misuse,83 and the appropriateness of the patent owner
controlling the price charged by the licensee for a product made using
a patent.- An example of narrow malfeasance sufficient to trigger the
misuse defense is collecting royalties based on total sales of the

licensee rather than based upon the licensee's actual use of the patent
if the "patentee insist[s] on a percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of
use, and ... reject[s] ... licensee['s] proposals to pay only for actual
use.85
C. The Misuse Defense as It Has Been Applied in Copyright Cases

Of the cases recognizing the existence of the copyright misuse
defense, only a minority have found that misuse was factually
established at trial.' Also, as demonstrated above, the cases have

been far from unified in what constitutes misuse. 87 To simplify the
analysis of the copyright misuse defense, the three categories of

wrongful conduct that have been found to be misuse of patent' will
be examined in a discussion of copyright cases.
The appropriateness of examining the patent law in copyright
cases was established in Lasercomb89 and DSC Communicatons.90 To
82. Compare Modrey v. American Gage & Mach. Co., 478 F.2d 470, 474-75 (2d
Cir. 1973) (holding that post-expiration royalties do not constitute misuse) with
Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 43 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that postexpiration royalties would be misuse), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972). See generally,
6 CHISUM, supra note 57, at § 19.04[31[d] (stating that although a provision requiring
royalties after the patent has expired is unenforceable, it is "unclear" if infringement
action would be barred by the misuse defense.). As Professor Chisum indicates, the
issue of the unenforceability of post-expiration royalty provisions is different from
whether such attempts constitute misuse. Cf Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33
(1964) ("us[ing patent] .. . leverage to project.., royalty payments beyond the life of
the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of a patent . .
83. See 6 CHISUM supra note 57, at § 19.04[3][f].
84. See id. at § 19.04[3][g]. Professor Chisum argues strongly that such price
fixing does constitute misuse and asserts that the contrary Supreme Court holding in
U.S. v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), has been, in effect, overruled by
subsequent cases. See id.
85. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969).
86. See supranote 19.
87. See supra note 33-55 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
89. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990).
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decide whether Lasercomb's licensing practices constituted misuse,
the court held that the misuse of copyright defense is "analogous to

the misuse of patent defense."9

The implication of this analogy is

that, at a minimum, what constitutes misuse of a patent should

constitute misuse of a copyright or, alternatively, should provide
guidance as to what conduct is misuse. Thus, tying a copyright license
to non-protected products, interfering with the development of
competing products, and using blanket licenses should all be relevant

to defining copyright misuse. For this reason, the three patent misuse
categories will be examined first. Following this discussion, the
language in Lasercomb and other cases suggesting that the misuse of

copyright defense can be established by conduct violating the policy
of the copyright law will be scrutinized.'

This article will suggest that

a principal source of the policy limitation for this branch of the misuse
defense should come from the constitutional balance prescribed for
the Copyright laws93 and from the statutorily imposed idea-expression
dichotomy.94
1. The Misuse Defense Triggered by Tying an Uncopyrighted
Product to the Copyrighted Product-In Lasercomb, the court
suggested that using a copyright to violate the antitrust laws would

be considered misuse.95 The district court had used an antitrust90. See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601
(5th Cir. 1979).
91. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977.
92. See id. at 978; see also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater,
604 F.2d 852, 865 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); In re Independent
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 964 F. Supp. 1469, 1477 (D. Kan. 1997).
93. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection...
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle or discovery ....) See generally, RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY & 1.04[1][c] (3d ed. 1997), stating that
Copyright protects 'works of authorship,' but excludes protection for
ideas, processes, methods of operation, discoveries, and material objects.
The distinction between unprotected ideas (processes or discoveries) and
expressive 'works of authorship' defines a fundamental limit of copyright
law .... Throughout, copyright protects only expression. It creates no
rights in the ideas expressed, facts disclosed, or processes described ....
Decisions concerning what constitutes an idea (or process) and what
constitutes expression are not mere technical questions; they incorporate
policy issues. Inherent in a judgment that some facet of a work
constitutes protected expression or unprotected idea is a judgment that
the particular element of the work should (or should not) be protected
against unauthorized copying. Resolution of that issue requires express
consideration of competition and innovation policy as well as of the
fundamental dichotomy between a free market of ideas and competition
dominated by proprietary rights.
95. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
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style analysis to reject the misuse defense holding that, under the
rule of reason concept,96 Lasercomb's licensing agreement should
be upheld. 97 The Court of Appeals rejected the necessity of using

the rule of reason analysis as that rule only applies to those cases
where the copyright monopoly is used to violate the antitrust laws,

not in cases where the misuse is predicated on some other type of
misconduct.98 The court's conclusion that the rule of reason would
be appropriate if the misuse alleged is an antitrust violation serves
as a clear indication that the court would find the use of a copyright
to violate the antitrust laws to be misuse.
Subsequently, in Service & Training,Inc. v. Data General Corp.,"
this dictum in Lasercomb was expanded into holding."°
Unfortunately for the defendant, the court went on to hold that the
defense had not been proven.' Similarly, in Data General Corp. v.
Grumman Systems Support Corp.," the First Circuit indicated, in
dicta, that tying the purchase of products to a copyright license could

constitute misuse of the copyright.' 3 Finally, in BroadcastMusic, Inc.
v. Moor-Law, Inc.,'04 the district court likewise held that a tying

96. The Supreme Court defined the "rule of reason" that is used in antitrust
analysis in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
As an understatement, much development has occurred since the rule was first
announced. See generally, Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of
Reason: a New Standardfor Section I of The Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753
(1994); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991); James A. Keyte,
What it Is and How it Is Being Applied: the "Quick Look" Rule of Reason, 11
ANTITRUST

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

21 (1997).

See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977.
See id. at 977-78.
963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 690.
See id.
36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1169-70.
203 U.S.P.Q 487 (D. Del. 1978).
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violation of the Sherman act would constitute a valid misuse of
copyright defense."
Thus, while it is rare to successfully establish copyright misuse
because of a tying violation, there is precedent that such conduct
should prevent enforcement of the copyright. Where one must
purchase or use additional products or services to gain access to a
copyrighted work, the major aspect of the misuse defense based on
tying has been established.
It is unclear, however, if the copyright holder must have
significant market power before a tying arrangement would constitute
misuse. For a tying arrangement to constitute misuse of patent, the
market power of the patent holder must be established only because
Congress enacted the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988.'" No such
It is
showing is required under the judicially developed doctrine.
unclear whether this congressionally created limitation on the patent
misuse defense should be applied to the copyright misuse defense.
On one hand, as the statement of congressional intent in the
Patent Misuse Reform Act is clear and the analogous treatment of the
two major federal intellectual property laws would seem appropriate,
the limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) should be applied to copyright
misuse. Additionally, as the analogous copyright misuse defense has
achieved its principal judicial recognition after the patent misuse
defense was limited," the full patent misuse defense should be
adopted, including existing statutory limitations.
On the other hand, the Patent Misuse Reform Act is an
exception to the scope of the misuse defense. Normally, exceptions in
the law are read narrowly."° This applies to exceptions in a statute"0
as well as to those enacted in derogation of the common law."' If
105. Id. at 488; see also, In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust
Litigation, 964 F. Supp. 1469, 1477-78 (D. Kan. 1997).
106. See Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat.
4674, 4675 (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 27(d)(4)-(5) (1994)).
107. See e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
108. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds was decided in 1990, two years after
Congress adopted the Patent Misuse Reform Act.
109. See e.g., Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 295 N.E.2d 487, 490 (I11.App. 1973)
(contract law); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Mevorah, 56 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (insurance law). See generally, 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.11 (5th ed. 1992).
110. See e.g., U.S. v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1932); Lungren v.
Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d
296, 299 (Va. 1988); Conservation Comm'n of Simsbury v. Price, 479 A.2d 187, 193
(Conn. 1984).
111. See e.g., U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) ("In order to abrogate a
common law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by
the common law.") (quotation marks omitted). As an interpretation of a federal
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read narrowly, the necessity of showing market power that exists in
the patent law should not be incorporated into the copyright misuse
defense.
The better argument would seem to be the former. By requiring
the market power of the copyright holder to be established in order to
prove a misuse by tying defense, a consistency between the two
federal intellectual property protection schemes will be created.
Additionally, the anti-competitive effect of a tying arrangement
where the copyright holder has an insignificant market share is
minimal as the licensee should be able to easily deal with one of the
larger market players. Thus, showing that the copyright holder tied
additional products to the copyright license while possessing "market
power in the relevant market" ' should be the prima facie case of
misuse of copyright by tying.
2. The Misuse Defense Triggered by Preventing the Copyright
Licensee from Developing Competing Products-The principal
conduct that the court examined in Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds was Lasercomb's attempt to prevent its licensee from
developing competing software.1 " The court found this to be a misuse
of the copyright.1 As the court held, the "licensing agreement...
essentially attempt[ed] to suppress any attempt by the licensee to
independently implement the idea which [the copyrighted work]
expresses." 5 It was this extension of the copyright, not a violation of
antitrust principles, which triggered the misuse of copyright.11 6 Thus,
Lasercomb is a clear precedent that the second patent misuse
category, the unlawfulness of limitations on developing competing
products, is also a copyright misuse category. A later Fourth Circuit
decision found a similar, but more egregious, violation to that found
in Lasercomb and thus reconfirmed the Lasercomb holding.17
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in DSC Communications Corp. v.
DGI Technologies, Inc. addressed DSC's "attempt[] to use its copy-

statute, the misuse of patent defense is part of the federal interstitial common law. See
U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973). See generally, 3
SINGER, supra note 109, at § 61.01
112. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994).
113. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 979.
117. See PRC Realty Systems, Inc. v. Nat'l Assoc. of Realtors, 972 F.2d 341 (4th
Cir. 1992). The copyright holder not only attempted to limit the licensee from
developing a product which would compete with the copyright holder's, but required
the licensee to use its "best efforts" to sell the copyright holder's products and
services. See id.
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right to obtain a patent-like monopoly over unpatented microprocessor cards... 18 In this case, DSC objected to DGI's copying and
execution of its copyrighted operating system as DGI tested its9
compatible circuit boards in DSC's telephone switching system."
Citing Lasercomb, the court held that "[t]he defense of copyright
misuse forbids the use of the copyright to secure an exclusive right or
Office, including a
limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright
120
cards.,
microprocessor
over
monopoly
limited
Thus, the approach of these two circuits seems to be consistent
with the second prong of the patent misuse doctrine. An attempt to
use the monopoly granted by copyright to forestall others from
developing non-infringing products constitutes a misuse of the
copyright.
3. The Misuse Defense Triggered by Using Blanket Licenses to
Market Multiple Copyrighted Works-In F.E.L. Publications, Ltd.
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,2' the Seventh Circuit discussed

blanket licenses as misuse both as an alleged extension of the
copyright monopoly and as the tying of products. 2 F.E.L. was a
music publisher that distributed sheet music to the defendant for
use in the Catholic church.' 3 The songs were distributed under a
annual license giving the defendant the right to make as many24
copies as desired of any of the 1,400 songs in F.E.L.'s catalog.'
F.E.L. filed suit against the defendant alleging that unauthorized
copies of the songs were being made.' 25 The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant as F.E.L. had
"extended [its] copyrights over exempt performances of the
copyrighted music, and... [used] a tying contract and a per se
,, 6 The court of appeals reversed
violation of the Sherman Act.
27
the district court on both grounds.'
The alleged extension of the copyright monopoly involved
whether F.E.L.'s license agreement improperly controlled not-for-

118. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th
Cir. 1996).
119. See id. at 598-99.
120. Id. at 601. Ultimately, DSC's use of its copyright was found to be misuse. See
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772,793 (5th Cir. 1999).
121. 214 U.S.P.Q 409 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
122. See id. at 413.
123. See id. at 410.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 411. At trial, it was shown that "over one and one-half million
unauthorized copies of F.E.L. songs were [made]." Id.
126. See F.E.L. Publications,214 U.S.P.Q. at 411 (footnote omitted).
127. See id.
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profit performances of the songs." Preventing such performances
were not among the rights given the copyright holder under the
Copyright Act of 1909.129 The court's discussion of this issue assumed
that an attempt to license not-for-profit performances would
constitute misuse without ever directly so holding.3 ° Instead, the
court determined that the F.E.L. license did not attempt to license
performances; it only licensed the making of copies and the
publication of those copies. 3 '
The court next turned to an examination of the blanket license
used by F.E.L.32 In its examination of F.E.L.'s licensing practices, the
Seventh Circuit was placed in a conundrum 33 between two U.S.
Supreme Court precedents, U.S. v. ParamountPictures,Inc.,' dealing
with tying arrangements, and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,35 dealing with blanket licenses. Indeed, a
comparison of these two cases serves to highlight the differences
between a tying arrangement and a blanket license. As the Seventh
Circuit ultimately decided that the license in F. E. L. Publicationswas a
blanket license rather than a tying arrangement, BroadcastMusic will
be discussed first.
Broadcast Music involved BMI's practice of issuing a blanket
license to CBS for CBS to use copyrighted songs controlled by BMI.136
CBS alleged that the blanket license, as price fixing1 37or a tying
arrangement, constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court rejected a per se antitrust violation for the blanket
13 8
license; rather, such licenses were to be subject to the rule of reason.
In the Court's justification of applying the rule of reason, the fact that
a monopoly had been given over the performance of music was
significant.

128. See id.
129. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970), repealed by Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541. The current copyright code continues
this limitation on a copyright holder's rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3)-(4) (1994).
130. See F.E.L. Publications,214 U.S.P.Q. at 411-13.
131. See id. at 412.
132. See id. at 413.
133. See Ronald F. Kehoe, Tying: The Current BalanceBetween Per Se and Rule of
Reason Analysis, 137 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 233,244-45 (1995).
134. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
135. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
136. See id. at 4. The license allowed CBS to perform all of the copyrighted songs
as often as CBS wished at a fee that was either a flat fee or was based on total
revenues. See id. at 5.
137. See id. at 6.
138. See id. at 16.
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In the first place, the line of commerce allegedly being
restrained, the performing rights to copyrighted music, exists at
all only because of the copyright laws. Those who would use
copyrighted music in public performances must secure consent
from the copyright owner or be liable at least for the statutory
damages for each infringement and, if the conduct is willful and
for the purpose of financial gain, to criminal penalties.
Furthermore, nothing in the Copyright Act of 1976 indicates in
the slightest that Congress intended to weaken the rights of
copyright owners to control the public performance of musical
compositions. Quite the contrary is true. Although the
copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix prices
among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws, we
would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably
necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be
deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, the
commerce anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected
against restraint by the Sherman Act would not exist at all or
would exist39 only as a pale reminder of what Congress
envisioned.

Further, the Court found that this kind of blanket license served
valid economic goals for both the copyright holders and the
performers," substantially lowered the cost of licensing the
performance of copyrighted works to both groups,' and did not
threaten competition in society. 42 As a consequence, the Court
remanded the case for consideration under the rule of reason.143
In U.S. v. ParamountPictures,Inc.,' the Court was called upon
to examine Paramount's practice of block booking.45 "Block-booking
is the practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature or
group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license
another feature or group of features released by the distributors
during a given period.' ' 146 The Court found this conduct to be
unlawful,' 7 and, by implication, a per se violation of the antitrust
laws. 48 Although the court did not clearly state it, the Paramount
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
See BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 20.
See id. at 21-22.
See id. at 23.
See id. at 24-25.

144. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 156.
See id.
See id. at 158.
Cf id. at 159.
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Pictures licensing
arrangement was deemed to be a tying
14 9
arrangement.
Thus, the similar licensing practices in Broadcast Music and
Paramount Pictures results in a remarkably different legal analysis.
Some argue that cases such as BroadcastMusic represent the Court's
decision to abolish the per se approach itself, consequently subjecting
all tying arrangements to a rule of reason analysis. 50 Alternatively,
others maintain that both the per se and rule of reason approach are
viable but the per se rule requires a preliminary analysis of the
competitive effects of the tying arrangement. 5' If the arrangement
has an anti-competitive effect, the per se rule is used and the practice
violates the Sherman Act; otherwise, the rule of reason is used to
determine if a violation has occurred." 2 As the Supreme Court held:
In characterizing this conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry
must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to
show effect, the purpose of the practice are to threaten the
proper operation of our predominantly free-market economythat is, whether the practice facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead
one designed to increase economic efficiency
and render
15 3
markets more, rather than less, competitive.
The Seventh Circuit in F.E.L. Publicationsv. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, found that F.E.L.'s licensing practices increased the
economic viability of the copyrighted compositions.
Thus, relying
on Broadcast Music rather than Paramount Pictures, the court
concluded that no misuse existed as "the [blanket license] has many
pro-competitive, redeeming features which prevent us from
'
presuming it illegal without further inquiry."155
Finding that the
license agreement had no anti-competitive effect,'5 6 the court

149. See ParamountPictures,334 U.S. at 159 ("All we hold to be illegal is a refusal
to license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted.").
150. See Piraino, Jr., Making Sense, supra note 96, at 1757-58.
151. See F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409,
414 (7th 1982).
152. See id.
153. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1920 (1979) ( quotation omitted).
154. See F.E.L. Publications, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 414.
155. Id. at 413.
156. See id. at 415.
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concluded that there was no violation of the rule of reason... and, as a

consequence, no misuse of copyright."'

III. The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution
A.

UnderstandingArticle I, Section 8, Clause 8

The Intellectual Property Clause in the Constitution is somewhat
of an enigma. It is included among the eighteen powers of Congress
set forth in Section 8 of Article I but, unlike the other clauses, no

formal discussion of it occurred at the Constitutional Convention in
1787.159 Ultimately, it received unanimous support by the delegates.'9
Further, the debate about the Clause that occurred as part of the postconvention ratification process is sparse.16' Thus, only the language
used by the framers and what can be deduced about their motivations
can be used to construe the Clause. Despite the meagerness of
historic information, however, from it one can learn much about the
Intellectual Property Clause.
Even the language of the Clause examined in isolation provides

important instruction about its meaning. "The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
This
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.' ' 162
establishes a clear balance- Congress can grant a limited-in-time
monopoly for an individual's 163 writings or discoveries, but the
157. See id.
158. Cf id.
159. See Irah Donner, The Copyright Clauseof the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the
Framers Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 361, 361
(1992).
160. See id.
161. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). The author's discussion of the
Clause was extremely terse: "The utility of [the intellectual property] power will
scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in
Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors." Id.
There was some debate of the Clause in the states as the Constitution was
ratified, but it was likewise unusual. Donner only identified two instances outside
of THE FEDERALIST No. 43 where this occurred-during Pennsylvania's
ratification convention, see Donner, supra note 159, at 376-77, and in a debate
between George Mason and James Iredell, see id. at 377.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
163. The Constitutional terms "author" and "inventor" are limited to individuals.
See Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TULANE L. REv. 1675, 1685 &
1700 n.154 (1997) (authors must be human); see also id. at 1696-97 (inventors must be
human).
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purpose of the monopoly must be to promote progress. Indeed, this
balance has been expressly and repeatedly acknowledged by the
Supreme Court.'6' "The clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation. This qualified authority... is limited to the promotion of
advances in the 'useful arts.' ... The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose."'65 The balance in the Intellectual Property
Clause has also been acknowledged by Congress as it has enacted
provisions under it.'66
164. See e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) ("The clause thus
describes both the objective which Congress may seek and the means to achieve it");
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The
court stated that
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
Id.
165. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). This balance has been
acknowledged in copyright law, also. See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 (1983).
What is, as of yet, still controversial is whether Congress can sidestep the
limitations in the Intellectual Property Clause by invoking its power under the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.3. The Eleventh Circuit recently
addressed this controversy as follows:
We note that there is some tension between the former line of cases
(Heart of Atlanta Motel, [379 U.S. 241 (1964)], the Trade-Mark Cases,
[100 U.S. 82 (1879)], and Authors League, [790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986)])
and the Railway Labor Executives, [455 U.S. 457 (1982)] case. The
former cases suggest that in some circumstances the Commerce Clause
can be used by Congress to accomplish something that the Copyright
Clause might not allow. But ...we take as a given that there are some
circumstances, as illustrated by Railway Labor Executives, in which the
Commerce Clause cannot be used by Congress to eradicate a limitation
placed upon Congress in another grant of power.
U.S. v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999). In interesting dicta,
however, the court clouded the waters of its holding: "We assume arguendo,
without deciding, that the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a
limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular use of the Commerce Clause
(e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were fundamentally inconsistent with the
particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g., the fixation requirement)." Id.
at 1280 n.12. As the anti-bootlegging statute did not require fixation, see id. at
1277, how can it not be "fundamentally inconsistent with.., the fixation
requirement"?
166. See H.R. REP.No. 2222, at 7 (1909), stating that
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in
his writings.... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by
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This balance is unique. Among all of the powers granted
Congress in Section 8, only the Intellectual Property Clause limits
Congress to the methodology to be used.1 67 This difference in drafting

reinforces the conclusion that the limitations in the Intellectual
Property Clause must be as important, if not more important, than
the grant of power.' 68 The framers of the Constitution would not have

included a unique limitation on Congress's power if it was not to have
significance. 69
securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their
writings ....In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider.., two
questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and
so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted
be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that
outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
Cf H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50 (1976) (indicating that some previously proposed
changes to the copyright law were not being presented to Congress as the changes
"ha[d] not been justified by a showing that [the change's] benefits will outweigh
the disadvantage of removing [the subject matter] from free public use.").
167. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 with U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-7, 9-18.
Several of the clauses have limitations addressed to matters other than methodology,
requiring the laws enacted by Congress under the particular clause to be "uniform"
see id., art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 4, limiting war appropriations to lasting two or less years, see
id., art. I, § 8, cl. 12, and leaving the selection and training of the militia to the states,
see id., art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
Interestingly, the U.S. v. Moghadam court did not expressly address the
difference in drafting in its analysis. See U.S. v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th
Cir. 1999). Of course, as the defendant in the case had waived part of his potential
constitutional challenge, the court did not face the limiting language of the
Intellectual Property Clause directly. See id. at 1282 n.17.
168. Cf Golden State Transit Corp., v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 n.4
(1989) ("We observed that if the first prepositional phrase, referring to constitutional
claims, included rights secured solely by the Supremacy Clause, the additional
language, providing jurisdiction for claims based on Acts of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens, would have been superfluous. ... In order to give meaning to
the entire statute, we held that the reference to constitutional claims therefore did not
include rights secured solely by the Supremacy Clause.") (citations omitted).
169. Cf. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc. v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69
(1982). The court stated:
We do not understand either appellant or the United States to argue that
Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under the
Commerce Clause. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy
Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon
Congress' power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the
United States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not
required by the Commerce Clause. [Citations omitted.] Thus, if we were
to hold that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy
laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy
laws.
Id. at 469. If Congress is allowed to ignore the balance imposed by the Intellectual
Property Clause, it would likewise "eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on
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The language chosen by the delegates addressed a fear held by
many of them that the federal government, acting through
Congress, would obtain the power to grant, effectively, a royal
prerogative:
It is precisely because the delegates were familiar with the
Statute of Monopolies either on legal or political terms that they
were not about to give the Congress any general power to create
monopolies. A broad power to create monopolies was too
reminiscent of the power of the royal prerogative which was the
last thing that anyone (with the possible exception of Alexander
Hamilton) wanted to grant to either the executive or the
legislative branches contemplated by the proposed Constitution.
While the Framers were cognizant that the patent grant
constituted an express exception to the general ban on
monopolies that had existed in England for more than one
hundred and fifty years, they also perceived patents to be
monopolies, albeit of a limited and acceptable type. Therefore,
if the Framers were to give power to Congress to secure
exclusive rights for limited times to inventors in their
discoveries, it was necessary to do so expressly. The explicit
grant of power70would have seemed so obvious as to merit almost
no discussion. 1
Thus, the unique drafting of the Intellectual Property Clause was
presumably deliberate. The framers were not so concerned with
granting the power to issue patents and copyrights;171 instead, they
were interested in limiting the scope of any that was granted. The
structure of the constitutional section being created, however, was
one of grants, not limitations. Consequently, while the framers had to
make the grant, both grammatically and to insure that Congress did
have the power to issue patents and copyrights, they immediately
limited it to prevent abusive monopolies from being created.
the power of Congress ....Id.
170. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progressof Science and Useful Arts:
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution,2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 37-38 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
171. Indeed, as Walterscheid discusses, James Madison argued in an analogous
situation that the lack of a specific grant of power to Congress to support domestic
manufacturing did not mean that Congress was prohibited from imposing import

duties. See Walterscheid, supra note 170 at 27-29. Madison felt that Congress's power
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 3
& 18, would be sufficient to allow Congress to so legislate. Building the analogy,
Walterscheid states, "the absence of an Intellectual Property Clause, or even the
outright rejection of such a clause by the Convention, would not per se have served as
a constitutional ground for precluding the Congress from granting patents under the
Commerce Clause." Id.at 29.
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The broad meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 is clear.

Unlike the powers established by the other clauses in Section 8, the
Intellectual Property Clause expressly limits Congress's authority.
Congress can grant copyright and patent monopolies, but they must
do so to achieve the purpose set forth in the Clause.
B. What "Promote[s]the Progressof Science and Useful Arts"?
As discussed, the Intellectual Property Clause requires Congress
to "promote the progress of science and useful arts., 17 2 But how is
"progress" promoted? As has been implied by numerous Supreme
Court opinions, the primary, and quite possibly the sole, way that

progress is achieved is through the disclosure of the work to the
public.

Early in the history of the United States, when the Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret the first patent act,173 the Court
acknowledged the public's right to disclosure when it held that "[t]he
full benefit of the discovery, after its enjoyment by the discoverer...
is preserved.' ' 174 This implication that the useful arts are to be
promoted under the constitutional intellectual property scheme by

the invention's or writing's disclosure has been reiterated in many
subsequent cases both under patent law175 and copyright law. 76 As the
Court stated in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Company, Inc.,177
[i]t may seem unfair that much of the fruit of [an author's] labor
may be used by others without compensation. As Justice
Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not "some
172. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
173. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
174. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218,241 (1832).
175. See e.g., Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 ("[T]he inventor who designedly,
and with the view of applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own profit,
withholds his invention from the public, comes not within the policy or objects of the
Constitution .... He does not promote, and, if aided in his design, would impede, the
progress of science and the useful arts.").
176. See e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) ("[Clopyright law
ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to
creative works .... ); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
471, 429 (1984) ("[A copyright monopoly] is intended ... to allow the public access to
the products of [the author's] genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired."); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("It is said that
reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of
his creative genius."); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879)("The very object of
publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the
useful knowledge which it contains.").
177. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is, rather, "the
essence of copyright," and a constitutional requirement. The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This principle,
known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy,
applies to all works of authorship,... This result is neither
unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright
advances the progress of science and art.17
When this disclosure must occur, however, will differ depending on
which type of intellectual property is involved.
For patent law, the disclosure occurs upon the issuance of the
The application for the patent must include a
patent.'79
"specification" of the invention. 8
This specification must fully
disclose the invention:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.18'
The Copyright Act is less clear about how the copyrighted
work is to be disclosed. The primary mechanism of disclosure is

contained in the idea/expression dichotomyn-the copyright law
grants exclusive rights to an author for the expression contained

within his or her work,8 3 while it does not grant any rights to the
178. Id. at 349-50 (citations omitted).
179. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994) (stating that patent applications are kept in
confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office). Once the patent is issued, the
application becomes a public document. See Utah Radio Products Co. v. Delco
Appliance Corp., 19 F. Supp. 143, 145 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
180. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
181. Id. §112.
182. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
350 (1991).
183. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
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underlying ideas."6 At the same time, unlike the Patent Act, the
Copyright Act contains no mandatory provision that requires a
copyright holder to disclose the work. Although the statute
requires that the work be provided to the copyright office as part of
the registration ' and deposit" process created by the statute,
neither will necessarily result in the public disclosure of the work.
First, neither registration nor deposit is absolutely mandatory as the
validity of the copyright is not affected by a failure to perform these
acts.'" Even if they are done, the copyright office is free to limit the
materials to be deposited 8" or to return them to the author'89
without apparent constitutional problems."' Thus, as a practical
matter, although the copyright act disallows an author from
claiming ownership of the ideas contained within his or her
expression, it does not force the author to actually disclose the
work.
Consequently, because of the way that Congress structured the
1976 Act, and in contrast to the patent law where such conduct
would be impossible, it has become practical for an author to
engage in conduct that constitutes doublethink-a full copyright
monopoly can be claimed by an author who never discloses his or
her work to the public. In other words, the author is able to claim
the copyright monopoly without being required to pay the
constitutionally required price. As there is no mechanism within
the statute to prevent the author from taking advantage of
doublethink, the court should turn to the only existing mechanism
that can prevent this abuse-the misuse of copyright defense.
184. See e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Learned Hand), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 408.
186. See id. §§ 407 & 408(b).
187. See e.g., Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, Inc., 29 F.3d 1529,
1531 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that copyright registration is not necessary for validity);
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir.
1981) (finding that copyright deposit is not necessary for validity).
188. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 407(c) & 408(c)(1); see, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)
(1999).
189. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vi) (1999) (stating that the Copyright Office will
return "secure test" deposits to the author after registration).
190. See National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.,
692 F.2d 478, 484-87 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983). But see, Charles
R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer
Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25,
68-69 (1993) ("These Copyright Office regulations in effect create a federal form of
trade secret protection for computer programs, but seem inconsistent with the
underlying policies of the Copyright Act, and thus may be in excess of the Copyright
Office's statutory authority.").
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IV. Preventing Constitutional Doublethink-The Applicability of
the Misuse Defense to Control Simultaneous Copyright and
Trade Secret Claims
There are several ways that the Copyright Act of 1976 may allow
an author to engage in doublethink by claiming a copyright monopoly
without disclosing the work. First, a work may never be published or
distributed with the author maintaining it strictly for his or her own
use. Second, an author can publish a work or otherwise distribute it
to others,91 but refuse to register or deposit it under the Act. Finally,
the work can be published, but in such a way as to attempt to prevent
the disclosure of the ideas it contains. As the constitutional analysis
of each of these differs, they will be discussed in turn.
A.

Unpublished Works

There are presumably more unpublished works under the
Copyright Act of 1976 than there are published ones. Under the
statute, copyright "subsists" in all works that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression." Thus, anytime someone jots down some
notes, or even makes a doodle during a meeting, federal copyright
protection is obtained for the resulting work. At the same time, most
of these unpublished works are never disclosed by the author to
anyone, nor does the statute require public disclosure for an
unpublished work. There is no mechanism within the act that insures
that the public will gain the ideas contained in these works as neither
registration nor deposit is required.'9 Apparently, then, the author is
given a monopoly under the Intellectual Property Clause but is never
required to comply with the public disclosure obligation that the
clause contains.
Congress believed that unpublished works would somehow
become available after the passage of time, however. "Common law
protection in 'unpublished' works is now perpetual ....[T]he [1976
copyright] bill would place a time limit on the duration of exclusive
rights in them. The [bill] would also aid scholarship and the
dissemination of historical materials by making unpublished,

191. For the purpose of this analysis, it is not important if the work has been
"published" as that term is defined in Section 101 of the Copyright Act; instead, a
broader meaning is implied. Any distribution made by the author is sufficient. See
generally,American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir. 1956).
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
193. See id. § 407(a) (stating that deposit is only required for "a work published in
the United States" (emphasis added)); see also id. § 408(a) (stating that registration is
"permissive" for all works).
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undisseminated manuscripts available for publication after a
'
reasonable period."194
Indeed, after the author's copyright term
expires,"' anyone who obtains the work would have the legal right to
reproduce or otherwise use it as it has entered the public domain. 96
Congress's perspective on the disclosure of unpublished works under
the 1976 Act seems to be one of improvement, therefore. As the
prior federal copyright law did not apply to unpublished works, thus
allowing them to remain undisclosed forever, the new law would
ultimately remove any copyright-like restrictions from the use of the
work thus providing the public with access to works that theretofore
had remained nonpublic.
Even if Congress's assertion of improved access is accepted,
however, one can still question whether the disclosure system
Congress established for unpublished works complies with the
public purpose requirement in the Intellectual Property Clause.
Many, if not most, of the unpublished works do not see the light of
day; indeed, hundreds of expressions were fixed in a tangible
medium of expression but were ultimately discarded during the
development of this article. To decide if the system Congress
created for unpublished works meets the constitutional requisite of
disclosure, the nature of an unpublished work must be considered.
From a practical perspective, as the work is unpublished it is
most unlikely that infringement will occur. After all, as many of the
unpublished works are destroyed soon after creation and many others
have no inherent worth, either no one is in the position to infringe the
copyright or no one is likely to try. Consequently, the "real" problem
with unpublished works is minuscule as their authors rarely enforce
the rights provided under the statute. Furthermore, should the author
of an unpublished work wish to enforce any of the rights he or she has
under the Act, the unpublished work must be first registered as a

194. H. REP. No. 1476, at 130 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
195. The term is the life of the author plus seventy years for non-pseudonymous,
non-corporate authors, or the shorter of ninety-five years from publication or 120
years from creation for all other types of authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994),
amended by Pub. L. No. 105-298, title I, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). As
unpublished works are being discussed, this term would apply even if the work was
created before the January 1, 1978 effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act. See id. §
303.
196. See Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New Horizons Corp., 897 F. Supp. 144, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Absent the.., copyright, Defendant would have had nothing of
value to sell or convey to Plaintiffs."), rev'd on other grounds, 168 F.3d 586 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2399 (1999).
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prerequisite for bringing suit."9 Thus, to affirmatively assert any
copyright right, some level of disclosure does occur.
As importantly, a countervailing constitutional consideration
exists. As the Supreme Court has indicated, the First Amendment
protects citizens from more than having speech prohibited-it also
prevents them from being forced to speak.198
Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and
what to leave unsaid, one important manifestation of the
principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may
also decide what not to say. Although the State may at times
prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising by
requiring the dissemination of purely factual and uncontroversial information, outside that context it may not compel
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees. Indeed
this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the
speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker
would rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of
defamation. Nor is the rule's benefit restricted to the press,
being enjoyed by business corporations generally and by
ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression as well
as by professional publishers. Its point is simply the point of all
speech protection, which is to shield just those choices of
content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.'99
Thus, for unpublished works, the constitutional balance is quite
different than for other types of works. In evaluating the law, the
First Amendment must be considered in addition to the public
purpose requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause. Were
Congress to require the author of an unpublished work to disclose
that work to the public, in effect, Congress would be requiring the
author to speak. This Congress cannot do.
Unpublished works, although most often undisclosed, do not
create constitutional doublethink problems, therefore. The disclosure requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause is made
significantly less important by the nature of unpublished works and,

197. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998); see also Tang v. Hwang, 799 F.
Supp. 499, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
198. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
199. Id. at 573-74 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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effectively, is trumped by the First Amendment's prohibition on
compelling speech.
B. Distributedor Published Works Where the Author Failsto
Register or Deposit Them
20
2
Although some have argued that the deposit " and registration '
requirements in the copyright act serve the purpose of publicly
disclosing the work to satisfy the public purpose requirement of the
Intellectual Property Clause,20 the statute and its legislative history
indicate that deposit and registration serve different purposes from
disclosure. For example, Congress empowered the Register of
Copyrights to issue regulations which greatly limit the material that
need be submitted in support of the application for registration;
indeed, the Register can specify that only "the deposit of identifying

material [be made] instead of copies ...

,203

Similarly, for the deposit,

"[t]he Register of Copyrights may by regulation exempt any
categories of materials from the deposit requirement of this
section... ."' In discussing these sections, the House Committee
indicated that registration and deposit serve an administrative rather
than disclosure raison d'etre:
The fundamental criteria governing regulations issued under
section 407(c) ... would be the needs and wants of the Library
[of Congress]. The purpose of this provision is to make the
deposit requirements as flexible as possible, so that there will be
200. "Deposit" is a requirement of the statute created in section 407. See 17
U.S.C. § 407 (1994). Although subject to many potential exceptions, it requires an
author to provide copies of the work to the Library of Congress upon publication. See
id. § 407(a).

201. "Registration" is a requirement of the statute created in section 408. See 17
U.S.C. § 408. It is the optional process of formally informing the Copyright Office of
the author's claim of copyright. See id. § 408(a).
202. See National Conference of Bar Examiners, 692 F.2d at 484-85. The court
found that
[Multistate] Legal Studies... challenges the validity of the secure test
regulation upon constitutional grounds. It argues that the regulation
serves to conceal the deposited material from public view and thus
defeats the purpose of copyright registration as mandated by art. I, § 8, cl.
8, of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to
'[p]romote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors exclusive rights to their respective writings
and discoveries.' Legal Studies bases this argument on the idea that
actual copies are necessary to provide a public record that delineates the
scope of the copyright monopoly.
Id.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1).
204. Id. § 407(c).
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no obligation to make deposits where it serves no purpose ....
The regulations... would necessarily balance the value of the
copies...
to the collections of the Library of Congress against the burdens
and costs to the copyright owner of providing them."

Subsection (c) of section 408... gives the Register latitude in
adjusting the type of material deposited to the needs of the
registration system. [The Register can] require or permit
20
deposit of identifying material rather than copies ....
Thus, Congress's intent for deposit and registration was not to
satisfy the public disclosure aspect of the Intellectual Property
Clause; rather, they are to allow the Register of Copyrights to
obtain sufficient information about a work to be able to register it
and to allow the Library of Congress to build its collection. It is
inappropriate, therefore, to impart on them a disclosure role.
These administratively oriented deposit and registration
requirements have been upheld by the courts. In Washingtonian Pub.
Co., Inc. v. Pearson,2° the Supreme Court condoned this
administrative purpose when interpreting similar procedures in force
under the 1909 Copyright Act. 2 °7 "[T]he requirement for deposit is
not for the purpose of [creating] a permanent record of copyrighted
publications and... such [a] record is not indispensable to the
existence of the copyright."2'
More recently, lower courts have
adopted the same logic for the 1976 Copyright Act.2 9 Surprisingly,
205. H. REP.No. 1476, at 130 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
206. 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
207. See id. at 41.
208. Id.
209. See National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.,
692 F.2d 478, 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied 464 U.S. 814 (1983). The court stated
that
The recognition in [Washingtonian Pub. Co., Inc. v. Pearson] that the
deposit and registration requirements under the Act were procedural
only and not constitutional prerequisites for a copyright has been carried
forward in the current statute by 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(a) and 411(a). Those
provisions make clear that registration is not a condition of copyright
protection. It follows that deposit regulations do not amount to
disclosure requirements; nor as a practical matter can they function as
such since a claimant may register any time prior to bringing suit on an
infringement claim.
Id.; see also Sylvestre v. Oswald, No. 91 Civ. 5060 (JSM), 1993 WL 179101, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1993) ("[T]here is no requirement that the Copyright Office
preserve deposits for longer than it deem [sic] necessary, which ...attenuates the
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and constituting a strong statement of the lack of importance that the
deposit has under the copyright law, one court felt that the deposit
requirement could not be sustained under the Intellectual Property
Clause itself; instead, the court felt it necessary to invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause to sustain the requirement." '
Thus, as a general matter, neither deposit nor registration appear
critical for the Intellectual Property Clause to be satisfied. Other
forms of disclosure are sufficient for the public to be benefitted.
Except as discussed in Section IV.C infra, once published presumably
many people will have access to the work."' Thus, even if the work
itself subsequently disappears, the members of the public who did
have access to the work will be able to continue to use freely the ideas
it contained.212 This satisfies the Intellectual Property Clause.
C. Published Works Where the Author Attempts to Prevent
Disclosure of the Ideas Contained
For non-published works and works that are distributed but not

registered or deposited, satisfaction of the constitutionally mandated
public purpose is obtained.

But what happens where an author

distributes a work, while making deliberate attempts to prevent
disclosure of the ideas contained within?

In other words, can an

author simultaneously claim both a copyright and a trade secret in the
same work?2 3 The constitutionally mandated answer is "no."
A clarifying example will focus the discussion-the creation and
distribution of a computer program in the retail marketplace.21 '

In

argument that deposit has a copyright as well as an archival function.") (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
210. See Ladd v. Law & Technology Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986). The better argument would seem to be that a deposit
requirement is part and parcel of promoting progress under the Intellectual Property
Clause. In other words, while deposit of the work may not be constitutionally
required by the Intellectual Property Clause, it certainly is allowed by it to encourage
broader disclosure.
211. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (" 'Publication' is the distribution of copies... of a
work to the public....").
212. See Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding
that "[i]t is elementary that copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or
information revealed by the author's work.") (quotation marks and citation omitted));
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (stating
that "[n]o author may copyright facts or ideas. § 102. The copyright is limited to
those aspects of the work-termed 'expression'-that display the stamp of the
author's originality.").
213. Again, the caveat expressed in supra note 6, bears repeating. It is not being
asserted that copyright law preempts trade secret law in toto. What is being
questioned is whether both systems can be used at the same time to protect a work.
214. Computer programs provide a good working example as they have been a
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designing an intellectual property protection scheme for a program,
the author has several choices. The program can be protected in
either of the two ways available under the Intellectual Property
Clause: copyright215 and, though with less than absolute certainty,
patent. 6 Additionally, state trade secret law can also be used.217
technology that has severely challenged the schemas of intellectual property law. As
one commentator said:
While other technologies have altered the character of society and the
legal system in the past, computer technology and information systems
now present a unique circumstance. In part, this uniqueness is because of
their ubiquitous potential for change and impact, the beginning stages of
which were evident at the start of the 1990s. ... However, the computer
revolution is also unique in its reliance on remarkable and astoundingly
rapid innovation. Microprocessors continue to become increasingly
compact, fast, and more capable. Software is becoming ever more
sophisticated and communications systems are made even more
intelligent. Although portions of the computer industry have matured or
are in the process of maturation, other segments remain wildly innovative
and unpredictable. There is an industry-wide emphasis on innovation
and research that has affected not only the way in which companies view
their position, but also the manner in which nation states, both industrial
and newly developing, view their internal economic health and position in
the global marketplace. Indeed, although many observers have described
this era as the Information or Computer Age, it might equally be
described as an Age of Innovation. The ability of businesses in this
industry to become or remain commercially viable often hinges on their
ability to lead, or at least closely follow, technological innovation.
Although research and development play a significant role in many fields,
they are critically important in the computer and related industries.
NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 94 at 1-1.
215. See e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); H. REP. No. 1476, at 130
(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
216. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct. 851 (1999). But see Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that a process for curing rubber could be patented
despite the use of a computer-implemented algorithm); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978) (holding that a method for updating alarm limits using a computerized
mathematical formula was not patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
(holding that an algorithm for converting numbers from binary-coded decimal to
binary was unpatentable).
217. See NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 94, at
3.02[2] ("There is no dispute that computer... software [is an] appropriate subject
matter for trade secret protection...."); Dickerman Assocs., Inc. v. Tiverton Bottled
Gas Co., 594 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Mass. 1984); Digital Development Corp. v. Int'l
Memory Systems, 185 U.S.P.Q. 136, 140 (S.D. Cal. 1973); Com-Share, Inc. v.
Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd, 458 F.2d
1341 (6th Cir, 1972); Jostens Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Systems, 318 N.W.2d 691, 699
(Minn. 1982); Schalk v. State, 823 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1006 (1992); State v. Tanner, 534 So. 2d 535, 538 (La. Ct. App.
1988); McCormack & Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Systems, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q.
432, 444 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1983); Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148,

2000]

COPYRIGHT AND TRADE SECRET CLAIMS

Assuming that the program is a typical one, much of its value comes
from the difficulty in designing, expressing and testing its algorithms,
with a more modest contribution from the algorithms themselves. 8
Similarly, the coding techniques chosen by the programmers are apt
to be fairly common techniques used by programmers in general.2 9
Thus, neither the algorithms nor programming techniques are likely
to be novel enough to qualify for a patent. °
Consequently, the program's author will be left to rely on
copyright law, trade secret law, or both; indeed, using both systems
simultaneously is quite common. 21 Therefore, the author may choose
154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Belth v. Insurance Dept., 406 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650 (Sup. Ct.
1977).
218. Cf. FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH 20 (ann. ed.
1995); CARMA L. MCCLURE, MANAGING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND
MAINTENANCE 3 (1981); Zelkowitz, Perspectives of Software Engineering, 10
COMPUTING SURVEYS 197 (1978).
219. Numerous collections of standardized algorithms have been published. These
collections give the technical details to programmers of how to code specific
procedures. More complicated systems can be built from these standardized blocks.
See, e.g., 1-3 DONALD E. KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING (3d ed.
1998); JACK J. PURDUM, ET AL., PROGRAMMER'S LIBRARY (1984); NIKLAUS WIRTH,
ALGORITHMS + DATA STRUCTURES' PROGRAMS (1976).
220. For this discussion, patentable programs are being excluded as, to obtain a
patent, full disclosure of the program-its "enablement"-is needed.
See
Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7487
(1996), stating that
An applicant's specification must enable a person skilled in the art to
make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation. ....
For a computer-related invention, the disclosure must enable a skilled
artisan to configure the computer to possess the requisite functionality,
and, where applicable, interrelate the computer with other elements to
yield the claimed invention, without the exercise of undue
experimentation.
Enablement "requires that the specification of a patent contain a written
description of the claimed invention and the manner and process of making and
using that invention in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which that invention pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use that invention." In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557,
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This does not require the inventor to disclose the actual
code used to program the computer as long as a reasonably skilled programmer
could reproduce the program without expending unreasonable efforts.
See
Northern Telecom v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
Without enablement, the patent is void. See Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp.,
284 U.S. 52, 54 (1931). Thus, for patented computer software, either adequate
disclosure occurs or no patent exists. This makes the constitutional concerns being
discussed in this article moot.
221. Using these two schemes together is quite common.
See PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 3.17 (2d ed. 1999); Peter G. Berger,
Note, The 1976 CopyrightAct's Preemptive Effect on State Trade Secret Law: Lessons
Drawn from Computer Associates v. Altai, 12 J.L. & COMMERCE 113, 114 (1992);
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to register the program although, to preserve any hope of trade secret

protection, the provisions of the regulations that allow limited filing of
a computer program that contains trade secrets will be used.222 As the
program itself is distributed, the author will insure that each
purchaser enters into a valid license agreement 23 which imposes an
appropriate duty of confidentiality on the purchaser.
If this dual protection scheme is successful, the author can both

have and eat his copyright cake. He or she obtains and uses the
monopolistic feast of rights granted by the Copyright Act, but
discloses nothing to society in exchange. This is doublethink. As the
Copyright statute provides no means for controlling the doublethink,2z the misuse defense becomes an appropriate mechanism for
implementing the constitutional balance contained in the Intellectual

Property Clause.
V.

Conclusion-Using the Misuse of Copyright Defense to

Prevent Constitutional Doublethink
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution was
designed to advance knowledge in society by enticing authors and

inventors to create new works by giving them a limited monopoly
of control over their works. The monopoly is fundamentally
limited, however. The author or inventor cannot control the work

forever, nor can he or she control aspects of the work that are

David Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: the Copyright/Trade Secret
Interface, 47 U. PITr. L. REv. 907, 909-10 (1986); Philip McGarrigle, Note,
Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Protection for Computer Programs, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1037, 1037-38 (1983); Stephen M. Dorvee, Note, Protecting
Trade Secrets Through Copyright, 1981 DUKE L.J. 981, 981-82 (1982); see also Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Limited, 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), affd, 847 F.2d 255
(5th Cir. 1988).
222. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(A)(2) (1999) (authorizing the deposit of as little
as the first and last twenty-five pages of the source code listing "with portions of the
source code containing trade secrets blocked-out.").
223. This author will not enter the debate in this article about what is necessary to
create a valid license agreement. Compare Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996); see also, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade
Secret? How Article 2B Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation
More Difficult), 87 CALIF. L. REv. 191 (1999).
224. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897903 (Minn. 1983) (presenting the requisites under the Uniform Trade Secret Act for
creating a trade secret). See generally, Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret
Law: Doctrine in Search ofJustification,86 CALIF. L. REv. 241 (1998).
225. For example, Congress could have more fully preempted state law in section
301 of Title 17 to prevent state law from protecting ideas in works included in the
copyright act.
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outside of the scope of the defined monopoly. Where the author or
inventor attempts to exceed the scope of the monopoly, the misuse
defense provides the mechanism by which society protects its ability
to advance.
In patent law, because disclosure of the work is a core
principle, the misuse defense predominantly controls attempts to
use the patent monopoly to gain control of additional markets. The
misuse defense is not required to insure disclosure as the patent is
invalid in toto if nondisclosure occurs.
In copyright law, however, disclosure of the work is not a
requisite of obtaining protection. It is possible for the author of
obtain a copyright without ever disclosing the work. Thus, the
scope of the copyright misuse defense must be expanded from the
patent defense. As society's knowledge will not be advanced if the
copyrighted work is not disclosed, the misuse defense must be
available to prevent the copyright from being enforced until such
time as disclosure occurs.
Consequently, both a trade secret and a copyright cannot be
asserted at the same time; instead, the author is given an option.
The author can enforce the copyright or, alternatively, he or she
can enforce the trade secret. But where an author attempts to do
both, either by contract or by court action, the misuse defense is
triggered.
Until such time as the work is disclosed, no copyright
protection can be available. If it were, Orwellian doublethink
would be ensconced in American constitutional law.
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